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The Relationship between Housing Prices and
Macroeconomic Factors in Spain
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This paper examines the effects of certain macroeconomic variables (i.e mortgages,
inflation, and employment) on the price of houses in Spain. An error correction vector
autoregressive (ECVAR) model is used to model the impact of the macroeconomic variables on
real housing prices. Variance decompositions will be analyzed to determine the extent to which
these variables have an effect on housing prices in Spain.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to take several macroeconomic variables (interest rates,
employment, and inflation) and model the impact of these variables on real housing prices in
Spain. The goal is to examine the relationship between these variables and analyze any
interesting indications, to use empirical tests to support basic economy theory surrounding
the relationships between the variables and provide policy implications.
This subject is important because the entire world is now in the throes of recession due to
the burst of a global asset bubble. With many financial institutions reeling from losses due to
risky loans to home borrowers, it may be helpful to analyze the world’s most extreme
housing scenario: the Spanish housing bubble. The Spanish housing bubble is different in
many regards from the United States housing bubble. In Spain, housing is the dominant and
most widely held asset, and is a substantial portion of the country’s GDP. Spanish housing
data has been criticized for being unreliable and biased, so this analysis will discover whether
the data can hold up to a series of tests and produce results that make sense. Readers will
learn of the various events leading up to and after the bust of the Spanish property bubble and
may be able to draw important implications from such analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will present a review of
literature, Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and results, and Section 4 will provide a
conclusion and policy implications.
2.0 TREND
The Spanish economy has experienced robust growth since the mid-1990s which has mainly
attributed to the housing sector. From 1995 to 2008, Spanish housing prices have risen 190%,
making the U.S housing market pale in comparison (Desmond, 2008). From 1999 to 2005,
prices for apartments and houses accelerated at an annual rate of 15% in Spain. The housing
market has been integral component of the Spanish economy. Housing related industries
compose 20% of the economy in Spain, as opposed to 10% in the U.S (Wharton, 2007).
Spain has one of the highest rates of homeownership in the world at approximately 80%,
higher than the estimated 67.8% homeownership rate in the United States. 1 Adding to this, the
1
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Spanish tax and legal system favor homeownership. Eviction is often an expensive and slow
process for owners.
Much of the lending done in Spain is related to the housing sector. According to Martinez
(2008), 60 percent of the credit granted to the private sector residents is related to the activity in
the real estate sector. Housing is the most important asset held by households, representing
66.1% of the total value of households’ real assets and 58.9% of the total value of all their assets.
There are several unique characteristics of the Spanish housing bubble which are important
to note. Robust housing price appreciation was coincidental with equally robust increases in
housing supply; between 2000 and 2007, homes built averaged 600,000 annually, a number
which exceeded the annual figures for Germany, France, the U.K and Italy combined. Also,
adjustable (i.e, variable) rate mortgages (ARM) account for nearly all of the stock of mortgages
(approximately 98%). This may be due to the expectations of low interest rates for the future due
to the primary objective of the European Central Bank to fight inflation and bank’s credibility for
doing so. Also to note, home equity withdrawals are a rare occurrences in Spain. In contrast to
the United States, Spain was relatively secure from the wake of the sub-prime crisis, as the
regulation of securitized assets in Spain was conservative. As opposed to the situation in the
United States, where securitization of mortgages was performed to transfer risk, in Spain
securitization was related mainly to funding purposes.
Causes for the Spanish Housing Bubble
In 1999, members of the European Union formally introduced the euro and subsequently the
monetary policy of all members was under the control of the European Central Bank. Spain’s
membership in this monetary union implied a sharp reduction in real interest rates. The reduction
in real interest rates substantially decreased the cost of capital for investment, and lowered the
discount factor for any expected future payoffs which should increase asset prices as a result
(Ayuso et al., 2006). The reduction in real interest rates bolstered borrowing and heightened
expectations for nominal stability of interest rates which allowed for the lengthening of
maturities for mortgage borrowing from 10 to 28 years between 1990 and 2007 (De Lis et al.,
2008).
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Demographic factors were also a significant factor. A generation of baby-boomers composed
the majority of the population, who, with their accumulated savings, were able to take advantage
of the ongoing housing bubble. Also, an explosion of immigration that took place in the last ten
years provided an abundance of cheap, unskilled labor for the construction sector and an
increased demand for housing. As of 2005, foreigners accounted for 7% of the population, a
statistic which has by estimates reached approximately 10% as of 2008 (Ayuso et al., 2006).
Additionally, speculation was fueled by an extraordinary influx of foreign-investors (those
seeking to speculate, purchase vacation or second homes, or both).
Credit expansion among households increased substantially in time with declines in the
household saving ratio. In 2005 the household saving ratio was around four percentage points
lower than the average over the first half of the previous decade, net financial saving (∆ in
financial assets minus ∆ in financial liabilities) has fallen dramatically, and private, non-financial
sector debt had risen to 160% of GDP, more than twice the 1995 ratio (Ayuso et al., 2006).
In Figure 1, average house prices have risen higher than historical norms in the past 10 years,
and have only just begun to decline. The author would like to point out it has been widely
assumed that official figures from the Ministry of Housing underestimate the true extent of the
current Spanish housing correction. The data used by this paper, published by the Ministry of
Housing (MiV), is provided by the Association of Official Appraisal Agencies in Spain
(ATASA). The fact that estimates are based on home appraisals presents a serious bias in the
data; appraisal agencies are pressured to overvalue homes when banks wish to lend out more
money, and pressured to undervalue homes during economic hard times. Adding to this problem,
a Bloomberg article investigated the fact that many banks have ownership equity stakes in homevaluation agencies (Sills et al., 2008). Thus, it is highly likely that the housing data may not be
the best representation of housing price evolution, though it does capture the trend.
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Figure 1: The Average Price of Housing per Meter Squared, 1995-2008

Source: Ministerio De Vivienda
Martinez (2008) argues that over the past two years the rise in interest rates was a major
cause of the bursting of the housing bubble, along with the over-valuation of house prices,
the excess housing supply and the growing debt levels of Spanish families. The EURIBOR
interest rate, which is commonly used for as the base interest rate for mortgage lending,
remained very low during the 2003-2005 period. The ensuing housing price appreciation,
along with a rise in stock markets, bolstered household and corporate net wealth. At the onset
of the financial crisis, the EURIBOR is shown to begin a sharp downward trajectory as the
European Central Bank responded to the financial turmoil. Figure 2 is graph of the
EURIBOR, which provides the base rate for mortgage rates, implies a negative correlation
with the price of housing.
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Figure 2: EURIBOR 12-month Interest Rate: 1999-2009

Source: Banco de Espana
Figure 3 shows the movements of the Spanish Consumer Price Index from 1995 to 2008. In
the beginning of the series, we see the decline of inflation. At that time, Spain had its own
central bank, and was implementing monetary policies in order to begin the transition into a
European Monetary Union. Upon formation of the EMU in 1999, inflation begins an upward
trajectory and stays within the range of 3.50%-2.50%, until peaking at 4.50% in early 2008. The
movements of inflation show a modest correlation with the upward trending housing data,
though it is expected the initial downward trend of CPI may prove to be a source of problems in
our results.
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Figure 3: Consumer Price Index from 1995‐
2008

Source: Banco de Espana
Figure 4 shows the trend in employment by millions from 1995 to 2008. Graph 5 shows the
registered number of unemployed, in millions, by branch of activity from 2006 to the current
quarter. Despite a large increase in the labor supply which stemmed from significant flows of
immigration and an increase in female participation rates, the average national unemployment
decreased from 22.9% in 1995 to a low of 8.26% in 2007, before climbing to 9.50% in early
2008.
In January 2009, the number of unemployed people rose by nearly 200,000, a 6.4% increase
over December and a 47% increase since January 2008 (Burnett, 2009). An article for the New
York Times described how Spain suffers more than other European countries in terms of
employment because of the vast oversupply of low-skilled jobs and the lack of investment in
retooling the country’s rigid labor market. The government intends to pressure banks to free up
liquidity as well as introduce a $13 billion public works program. Recent projections of the
national average unemployment rate by the end of 2009 are approximately 16%.
Figure 4: Employment in millions from 1995-2008
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Source: Banco de Espana

Figure 5: Registered Number of Unemployed (in millions) by Branch of Activity, 20062009

Source: Banco de Espana

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
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The workings of this paper will take example and guidance from several others. Apergis
(2003) provides this paper with a blueprint for empirical analysis. The paper by Apergis
analyzes the dynamic effects of macroeconomic variables on the price of new houses sold in
Greece. The empirical methodology utilizes unit root tests, cointegration analysis, an error
correction model, variance decompositions, and impulse responses which will all be utilized
later.
A paper by Ayuso, Blanco, and Restoy (2006) provides analysis of house prices and real
interest rates in Spain. The paper analyzes the contribution of interest rates to the recent
course of housing prices in Spain. Ayuso, Blanco and Retory create a refined asset pricing
model that shows that changes in the discount factor cannot fully explain the trend of house
prices in Spain, providing support for the inclusion of other macroeconomic variables.
A paper by Kearl (1979) examines the influences of inflation on housing, mortgages and
construction by constructing a model. Though this model cannot quantify unspecified
uncertainties in economic conditions, the model supports evidence that inflation distortions
have significant effect on the housing prices and thus the demand for housing.
Katja (2006) tests for the existence of real estate bubbles using traditional unit root tests
under the assumption that the dividend yield ratio in stock markets is comparable to the rentprice ratio in the housing market. The paper provided valuable insight into recent
developments in housing markets and unit root based testing.
4.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The empirical analysis was carried out using quarterly data from 1995 to 2008. The variables
used in the empirical analysis are housing price (HP) obtained from the Ministry of Housing in
Spain, the mortgage interest rate (calculated as the weighted average of 3-year mortgage loans)
obtained from the Bank of Spain website (INT), prices measured by the consumer price index
from the National Institute of Statistics (CPI), and employment measured in millions (EMP). The
housing price data is the average price per meter squared of appraised housing in Spain, deflated
by dividing it by CPI. The empirical analysis was performed using Eviews 6.0.

Unit Root Testing
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The variables were tested for unit root non-stationarity by using unit root tests proposed
by Phillips and Perron (1987). If a time series has a unit root, then the time series is said to be
non-stationary. Stationarity is a stochastic (in other words, random) process whose
characteristics such as mean and variance do not change over time or position. A unit-root would
imply that the variance of a time series would increase to infinity over time. The Philips-Perron
test was chosen because the test is nonparametric with respect to nuisance parameters, allowing
for a wider class of time series models in which there is a unit root. The method also has
advantages when there are moving average components in the time series. The results are
reported in Table 1. When second differences were used, unit root non-stationary could be
rejected at the 1% significance level, suggesting that the variables HP, INT, and CPI are I(2)
variables or integrated in the first order, which means that it takes one first difference of the
series to make it stationary.

Table 1: Unit-Roots
Without
trend

(Philips- Perron)

Variable Levels

First

With
Trend
Second

Levels

First

Second

Differences Differences
Differences Differences
HP
-0.76
-2.29
-7.15***
-1.1
-2.36 -10.02***
INT
-1.16
-3.32**
-6.02***
-0.98
-3.18 -5.83***
EMP
-2.04
-2.29
-5.37***
1.24
-2.52 -5.56***
CPI
-2.06
-3.35**
-4.69***
-2.19 -3.33*
-4.56***
Figures in under first differences denote t-statistics.
Note: *,**,*** depict each variable as a 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level.

Cointegration Analysis
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The possibility of cointegration among these variables was examined next. Cointegration
is property of time series variables; if two or more series are non-stationary, but a linear
combination of them is stationary, the series are said to be cointegrated. We can test that there is
a statistically significant connection between all the macroeconomic variables by testing for a
cointegrating vector. The results are presented in Table 2. Allowing for linear deterministic trend
in the data, and an intercept and trend in the cointegrating equation, both the trace eigenvalue test
statistic and max eigenvalue test statistic indicate the presence of two cointegrating vectors. The
following is the vector autoregression estimate. There appears to be evidence in favor of the
existence of a common cointegrating vector among the variables under examination.
Table 2: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)

Trace
Statistic

0.05 Max-Eigen
Critical
Value

Statistic

0.05
Critical
Value

None *
115.7173
63.8761
49.98748
32.11832
At most 1 *
65.72986
42.91525
31.01759
25.82321
At most 2 *
34.71227
25.87211
24.18815
19.38704
At most 3
10.52413
12.51798
10.52413
12.51798
Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
An Error Correction Model
As cointegration is confirmed, we go ahead and estimate an error correction vector
autoregressive (ECVAR) model. A vector error correction model is a restricted VAR designed
for use with non-stationary series that are known to be cointegrated. The model is specified so
that it restricts the long-run behavior of the endogenous variables to converge to their
cointegrating relationships while allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. The cointegration
term, known as the error correction (EC) term, gradually corrects deviation from the long-run
equilibrium through a series of partial short-run adjustments. Our ECVAR model will involve
four variables (real housing prices, mortgage interest rates, CPI, and change in unemployment)
along with a 2-lag specification. Interest rates are expected to have a negative sign, CPI is
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expected to have a positive sign, and employment is expected to have a positive sign. The
ECVAR estimations provided the following results:

∆HP =

0.782∆HP(-1)

- 0.317∆HP(-2)

- 14.69∆INT(-1)

- 0.384∆INT(-2)

-

[ 4.40448]

[-1.38186]

[-122552]

[ -0.03194]

[ -1.69010]

+ 0.131∆EMP(-2)

- 11.59∆CPI(-1)

- 13.22∆CPI(-2)

+ 0.045∆EC

[ 4.37221]
R-squared
Adj. R-squared

[-0.80215]

[-0.58731]
0.774241
0.698989

0.07∆EMP(-1)

[1.79170]

EC is the error correction term. Figures in brackets denote t-statistics.
The results received are somewhat disappointing at first glance. The variable of interest rates,
when lagged once, was shown to have a negative effect on housing prices, as basic economy
theory suggests. When INT is lagged twice, the variable changes into a positive sign. The
variable of employment achieves the expected sign at the second lag. The variable of inflation
does not have the expected sign at first or second lags. The negative and statistically significant
coefficient of the EC term implies a significant adjustment to disequilibrium deviations of
housing prices from their optimal level determined by the long-run (cointegrated) housing price
equation.
There are several reasons the results might not have met expectations. If one carefully
examines the trends of our variables in the previous section, we can see how some problems may
arise. Inflation, as well, was volatile and experienced several steep declines over the length of the
time series, which may have affected its relationship with housing prices. Interest rates on the
other hand have our expected signs and are negatively related to housing prices.The employment
time series looks extremely positively correlated with housing prices, yet a first lag returns a
negative sign.
Variance Decompositions

Empirical Economic Bulletin, Spring 2009, Vol. 2

13

Fitzgerald - The Relationship of Housing Prices and Marcoeconomic Factors in Spain

A variance decomposition shows how much variation is produced in an endogenous
variable by a shock to a specific variable. In other words, variance decompositions provide
information about the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables in
the VAR. Each column gives the percentage of the forecast variance due to each innovation, with
each row adding up to 100.

Table 5: Variance Decompositions
Variance Decomposition
of HP:
Period
S.E.
HP
1
4
8
12
16
20

15.94554
53.59956
124.4781
225.9642
348.9765
503.1644

100
68.08932
56.11677
70.68651
76.53153
80.09069

INT

CPI

0
28.38433
25.39279
19.10614
16.51407
14.2412

0
1.26368
15.98766
9.271156
6.408209
5.173149

EMP
0
2.262673
2.502779
0.936191
0.546191
0.494962

The results from Table 5 suggest that, up to 4 quarters, shocks to the housing mortgage rate
account for more variation in real housing prices than variation produced by shocks to
employment or inflation. Over a longer period, up to 20 quarters, shocks to both the housing
mortgage rate and inflation account for more variation in real housing prices. The variable with
the highest explanatory power over the variation in real housing prices is the housing mortgage
rate, the second being inflation, and third being employment.
Impulse Responses
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Figure

Response of HP to Cholesky
One S.D. Innovations
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An impulse response traces the effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations
(variables) on the current and future values of the endogenous variables. In other words, it shows
the dynamic behavior of a variable due to random shocks in other variables. Table 6 shows the
response of housing prices to shocks in the mortgage interest rate, CPI, and unemployment. The
impulse response functions are based on 500 Monte Carlo replications. These impulse responses
are sensitive to the ordering of the variables, so different ordering might be in order to provide
support, if any, to the results.
In Table 6, as basic economic theory would suggest, a positive (higher) shock to the
mortgage interest rate indicates that as the cost of financing a house purchase increases, the
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demand, and thus the price for housing falls. In response to a shock in mortgage interest rates,
housing prices reach their steady state level at around 6 quarters. A positive (increase) shock to
inflation leads to higher housing prices; the impulse response does not show housing prices
reaching their steady state level within 20 quarters. Finally, a positive shock in unemployment
initially shows a decrease in housing prices (and thus demand for homes), while by 7 or 8
quarters housing prices continue to rise.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The main objective of this paper was to analyze the dynamic effects of certain
macroeconomic variables (the mortgage interest rate, inflation and employment) on real housing
prices. The results suggest that real housing prices do respond to specific economic variables.
Variance decompositions show that the mortgage interest rate is the variable with the highest
explanatory power over the variation in real housing prices, followed by inflation, then
employment. Impulse responses show that a positive shock in the mortgage interest rate
depresses real housing prices and will eventually lead to higher housing demand, while a positive
shock in inflation and employment will increase real housing prices and will lead to lower
housing demand.
After analyzing the results of our empirical tests, it is apparent that the most important factor
for determining policies relating to housing are mortgage interest rates. It has been argued that
low inflation environments will cause people to overvalue long-duration assets, i.e, a money
“illusion” (Brunnermeir and Julliard, 2007), which would tend to lead to asset bubbles and busts.
Due to the focus of the European Central Bank on maintaining a low inflation environment, such
an argument might imply that Spain must find a solution to the natural tendency to overvalue
long-duration assets.
Economists have discussed the susceptibility of the Spanish economy to economic cycles.
The integration of Spain into the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the ensuing reduction in
real interest rates and increased expectations for monetary stability can be cited as one significant
source of the housing bubble. The Bank of Spain, with its monetary defenses taken away, had no
defense against the easing of interest rates by the EMU.
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It may important to note the conflicts of interest faced by political officeholders that may
have resulted in failures to recognize or act against the housing bubble. The fact that housing is
the biggest asset of the voting base, and that the construction sector produces a large amount of
employment will be on the mind of any political incumbent when making policy decisions, or
running for a second term.
Policy Implications
Policy implications would have to take into consideration that Spain no longer has
control over interest rates. Without the control over interest rates, Spain could concentrate on
collecting more reliable data on housing, tax incentives, reducing economic dependency on low
skill labor and increasing regulation.
Spain could improve the integrity of their data. One of the problems encountered during
the creation of this paper was accessing even marginally reliable data on housing prices. An
official Spanish Housing Price Index that is derived from actual housing transaction prices is
published by the Institute for National Statistics yet only has data from 2007. The housing prices
used in the time series were taken from the Ministry of Housing in Spain, whose housing data
has been criticized due to the fact that it is based off of appraisals. In Spain, home appraisal
agencies are often owned by banks! The potential for bias is obvious. Spain needs to provide
adequate, reliable data in order to better understand and prevent housing bubbles.
Spain could remove tax incentives which promoted house ownership, such as, the income
tax deduction for owning a house. The tax deduction makes housing more valuable in
comparison to other investment decisions, and to renting. This tax incentive without question
aided in the creating one of the highest home ownership rates in the world ( approximately
81.0% in 2005).
Spain must reduce its economy dependence of low skill labor and increase regulatory
oversight over immigration and abuse of illegal labor. The existence of cheap, illegal immigrant
labor had aided in overdevelopment of real estate projects, has expanded the black market, and
has cut legal residents out of work. Also, the predominance of low skill labor in Spain’s
economy makes the economy more susceptible to volatility. When times are good, low skill
employment will be in high demand, and when times are bad, low skill workers will quickly find
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themselves out of work. Spain has been noted for its rigid labor market; this needs to be
remedied.
Spain must clamp down on the current state of appraisals/valuations. As mentioned
earlier, there is an unmistakable conflict of interest, as banks have been known to own ownership
stakes in the home-valuation agencies they use. It is only recently, in December 2007, that a law
was instituted that limited the amount of business appraisers can take from clients with
ownership stakes (such as banks).

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anonymous, (2007), “Real Estate Collapses, and Spain Trembles”, Universia
Knowledge@Wharton,
http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewfeature&id=1341&language=english
Apergis, Nicholas, (2003), “Housing Prices and Macroeconomic Factors: Prospects within the
European Monetary Union”, International Real Estate Review, Vol. 6 No. 1: pp 63-74.
Arellano, Manuel and Bentolila, Samuel, (2009), “Quien es responsible de la burbuja
inmobililaria?” El
Pais.com,http://www.elpais.com/articulo/semana/Quien/responsable/burbuja/inmobiliaria/elpepu

Empirical Economic Bulletin, Spring 2009, Vol. 2

18

Fitzgerald - The Relationship of Housing Prices and Marcoeconomic Factors in Spain

econeg/20090222elpneglse_2/Tes, Translated into English:
http://www.creditwritedowns.com/2009/02/spain-who-is-responsible-for-the-propertybubble.html
Ayuso, J. and Blanco, R. and Restoy, F.,(2006), “House prices and real interest rates in Spain”,
Banco de Espana Ocassional Papers, 0608.
Brunnermeir, Markus K. and Julliard, Christian, (2006), “Money Illusion and Housing Frenzies”,
C.E.P.R Discussion Papers, 6183.
Burnett, Victoria, (2009), “Spain’s Unemployment Rose Sharply in January”, The New York
Times, < http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/business/worldbusiness/04specon.html?_r=1>
De Lis, Santiago Fern and Herrero, Alicia Garcia, (2008), “The Housing Boom andButs in
Spain: Impact of the Securitisation Model and Dynamic Provisioning” <
http://www.allbusiness.com/economy-economic-indicators/economic-policy/11760429-1.html>
Katja, Taipalus, (2006), “A global house price bubble? Evaluation based on a new rent-price
approach”, Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, 29/2006.
Kearl, J.H ,(1979), “Inflation, mortgages, and housing”, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 1-29.
Lachman, Desmond, (2008), “The Housing Pain in Spain”, New York Sun. Accessed 03/17/09.
http://www.nysun.com/opinion/housing-pain-in-spain/72501/
Martinez, Maria Teresa Sanchez, (2008), “The Spanish Financial System: Facing up to the Real
Estate Crisis and Credit Crunch”, European Journal of Housing Policy, 8, 181-196.
Peter C.B. Phillips & Pierre Perron, (1986), “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression”,
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, 795R.
Sills, Ben and Duarte, Esteban, (2008), “Spain’s Inflated Home Values Infect Mortgage Bonds”,
Bloomberg.com <
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601170&refer=home&sid=avLtlLCD0wcQ>
Spain Real Estate Index, [source for housing price data]
< http://www.spainrei.com/Spain-Property-Prices.shtml>

Empirical Economic Bulletin, Spring 2009, Vol. 2

19

